The Five Buddha Districts system prevailed from the 1790s to the 1880s on the frontier between Yunnan, in Southwest China, and the Burmese Kingdom, in the mountainous areas to the west of the Mekong River. Through more than a century of political mobilization, the Lahu communities in this area became an integrated and militarized society, and their culture was reconstructed in the historical context of ethnic conflicts, competition, and cooperation among the Wa, Dai, and Han Chinese settlers. The political elites of the Five Buddha Districts, however, were monks who had escaped the strict orthodoxy of the Qing government to become local chieftains, or rebels, depending on political changes in southern Yunnan. As a centralized polity, the Five Buddha Districts system was attached to the frontier politics of the Qing state before the coming of European colonial powers. The Qing state provided a sociopolitical space for local groups to develop their political ideals between various powerful Dai-Shan chieftains. The negotiation, competition, and cooperation between the Five Buddha leadership and the Qing, Dai chieftains, and neighboring political powers had been thoroughly integrated into the frontier politics of this interdependent society for more than two hundred years. As the history of the Yunnan-Burma frontier formation shows that no mountain space existed to allow the natives to escape from the state through their shifting agriculture, and anarchism was not practiced by the mountain people who were separated from the state, the author argues that a stateless region like James Scott's "Zomia" did not historically exist in this region.
kingdom. These monks-cum-political leaders still maintained their subordinate roles as low-level "local chieftains" (tumu ), however. They interacted with the Qing state for many years, until the Qing government finally destroyed the system in response to social changes taking place in Burma with the coming of British colonial power after 1885. This article thus examines a particular political style that developed in the frontier context, a style that could be viewed as a political appendage to the Qing state from the 1790s to the 1890s. In order to respond to a series of academic theories about this frontier, cases like this should be considered in the context of the wider literature concerning state extension on the frontier or social encounters between different political systems on the borderland between China and Southeast Asia (especially between Yunnan and Burma).
Ma 56
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review E-Journal No. 8 (September 2013) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-8)
Two types of scholarship with very different perspectives on topics like ethnic relationships, state power, and markets in this region are currently being produced. One group comprises scholars who are trained in Sinology, studying Chinese history; the other is composed of scholars who are looking at China from their training as Southeast Asianists. In the latter group, James Scott (2009) has contributed to a reevaluation of the social and cultural characteristics of mountain groups such as the Lahu, Wa, Akha, and Hani and their relationships with the so-called lowland state in highland Southeast Asia and Southeast China. Scott points out that, as the reach of the Chinese state expanded, these mountain peoples were either absorbed into the Han or moved away, often after a failed revolt. As this process was repeated again and again, culturally complex zones of refuge sprang up in the region's hinterlands. Scott developed the concept of "Zomia" to describe zones of refuge. Zomia was a non-state space based on certain ecological regularities and structural relationships that did not hesitate to cross national frontiers (Scott 2009, 23-26) .
Tatsuki Kataoka disagrees, however, with Scott's claim that the Lahu are one of the typically stateless people of "Zomia" whose culture rejected the notion of a state. Instead, he argues that the Lahu became stateless and were conscious of the loss of their state after the process of modern state formation began. Kataoka claims that English-language scholars have misinterpreted this due to their inability to access the history of the Lahu (Kataoka 2013) . In this article, I contend that the notion of a "stateless Lahu" did not exist in Yunnan either before Qing officials destroyed the Five Buddha Districts system or after. I provide detailed information about the rise and fall of the Lahu political system, showing how the state created the Five Buddha Districts and, further, how social agency attached this system to the state through negotiations with neighboring political-identity systems on the frontier between Yunnan and Burma.
In contrast to Scott and other Southeast Asianists, scholars studying China offer different perspectives on the junction between China and Southeast Asia and, more specifically, between Yunnan and Burma (figure 2). For instance, C. Patterson Giersch points out that the YunnanBurma frontier was regarded by American anthropologist William Skinner as one part of a "macroregion" market and urban system of China (Giersch 2011) . Giersch observes that the circulation of goods (in particular, the circulation of copper and cotton) between Yunnan, South China, Tonkin, and Burma-ignored by Skinner-was central to Yunnan's economy during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. Circulation involves more than just mobility or trade; it implies long-term relations created by repeated flows that transform society (Giersch 2011 ).
However, in his earlier work, Giersch also argues that the frontier between Yunnan and Burma is a "middle ground," because it contains places of fluid cultural and economic exchange where acculturation and the creation of hybrid institutions are contingent on local conditions. In this land, newcomers and natives adapted in order to manipulate each other. Meanwhile, the Qing never demarcated clear political boundaries along this frontier (Giersch 2006, 3-4) . However, the ethnicity of the natives was closely linked with the Qing state's policies.
Additionally, the formation of the Yunnan-Burma frontier was a dynamic process, and clear boundaries were maintained between interior official counties and exterior Dai-Shan chieftaincies. The population included both the previous mountain peoples and the Han settlers who worked in the mines or were driven away by Qing officials from east of the Mekong River to the mountains west of the same river in the 1790s. Together, the settlers established a political system based on their religious and administrative centers and whether or not the Qing government attacked them frequently or allowed them to work as local agency. But the mountain communities had maintained their own system for more than a century under the conditions that Giersch lays out, such as goods exchange and the increase and decline of the mining industry.
However, Giersch does not mention the wars between the Qing and the Alaungpaya dynasty in Burma from 1764 to 1770, nor the decline in the mining industry in this region before the 1790s (Ma 2011). In this way, although the frontier was a zone in which multiple peoples met, it was also a zone of ethnic creation and the space of frontier agents. This zone was used in the Luohei's struggles and negotiations with the state and other local political systems for the political and cultural construction of Lahu identity.
Social Change and Ethnic Conflict in the Early Qing in Southern Yunnan
After the Ming government set up its administrative system in Yunnan in the 1380s, there were numerous revolts in central and western Yunnan. Eventually, the Ming government came to control the transportation routes and cities in the main basins. However, the region beyond the Red River, called the River's Exterior (jiang wai ), was under the jurisdiction of native Dai (bai yi ) chieftains. Because the Red River's inhabitants belonged to the category of "barbarian households" (yi hu ), they were not required to register in the official county records or to pay land taxes to the government, even though they did pay taxes and corvée to their native chieftains (Huang [1922 (Huang [ ] 1968 Ni [1846 Ni [ ] 1992 Ni [ , [1719 2001). The Ming government exerted strict control over the security of the main transportation routes, but it had a different strategy for controlling the mountain areas (Ma 2013e).
Because of wars and the government's revenue policy changes, especially the change from poll tax to hidage (a tax based on units of land owned) in the late Ming and the early Qing, more and more Han migrants moved to Yunnan, causing demographic change in the inner provinces. Historian James Lee did a series of studies on the issue of population change, which
showed that the Chinese population increased threefold during the early and middle Qing dynasty, from 150 million in 1700 to 450 million in 1850 (Lee 1982, 711) . During this period, the estimated population in Yunnan and Guizhou increased fourfold, from five million to twenty million, suggesting that some of the newly increased population had shifted from the inner provinces to the southwest frontier. Among those migrants, miners accounted for 10 percent in the 1750s, but increased to 30 percent-or about half a million-in 1800. In Yunnan, immigrants made up about 20 percent of the total population, about 20 million inhabitants (Lee 1982, 711) .
This demographic change was also bound with the political change in Yunnan. Before the Qing government carried out political reforms to integrate the native chieftain system into official counties (Gaitu Guiliu ) in the 1720s, large numbers of immigrants settled in southern
Yunnan, especially south of the Ailao Mountains. The Qing officials realized that, with more and more Han immigrants settling in these mountain areas, social transformation from chieftain jurisdiction to the official county system would be accomplished. The political reform from chieftaincy to county was also facilitated by the implementation of a new system of taxation and farmland management. In order to make farmland freely available on the open market it had to be measured so that it could be easily bought and sold, and land tax was allocated to the new, individual owners (Ma 2013a). This reform attracted even more immigration from the interior counties of China.
Until the 1850s, resettled immigrants comprised more than 60 percent of the local population (Fang 2003) . In parallel to the process of immigration settlement in southern Yunnan, the Qing government also extended the official administrative system based on calculations of possible revenue income, which could come from the tea and salt trade (YT 1840) . From the 1720s to the 1750s, the Qing government in southern Yunnan reformed its salt policy in order to extract more income from the salt wells in the Weiyuan River area after the Puer Prefecture was established. In the 1750s, whole areas of Shunning Prefecture (figure 3), as well as the Dai chieftain areas west of the Mekong River, came under the same salt-consuming district (Dang [1904 (Dang [ ] 2001 . Meanwhile, the Yunnan-Guizhou governor, Ertai, established an official teaselling system. After 1748, the government converted the tea-trade building into an official store and created a tea-coupon system similar to that used in the salt trade. Businesspeople had to first apply for tea coupons from prefecture officials, then take these coupons to the mountainous areas east of the Mekong River in Puer Prefecture to buy tea from the official tea store, and finally move the tea by caravan to other parts of China (Kun [1886 (Kun [ ] 2003 . The Qing government tried to manage the Luohei "bandits" into a human fence by driving them to the mountains west of the Mekong River, and they demarcated the Luohei Mountains with the inner land of Weiyuan and Simao Counties by the Mekong River in the 1790s, after resistance rose against the salt policies.
As more indigenous groups became involved in political resistance against the Qing government's taxation reform policies from the 1720s to the 1790s, the alliance came to include Luohei settlers and miners from Jianxi and Hunan, as well as from some interior counties such as Dali, Chuxiong, and Shiping. This was also the time of the wars between Qing China and the Burmese Kingdom. The monks who followed the teachings of the Big Vehicle Religion also became active in the terrain between the chieftains of Mengmeng, Menglian, and Gengma, and their religious teachings quickly spread throughout the mountain communities. In brief, the Quan ( ) system in the mountains, which had been under the chieftains' management and was based Mengmeng chieftain continued to harry Monk Yang and his followers for many years, until the monks led their warriors against the chieftain and drove him out to Mianning. The conflicts were reported to the provincial governors, and then to the Qing court (YST 344-19-1960; Yang [1908] 1995 ). This became the official term for the districts in the Upper and Lower Converts mountain areas and is still used today (Zhou [1945 (Zhou [ ] 2007 . From the 1790s to the 1880s, this region, from Mianning in the north to Cheli in the south, gradually divided into four, five, and then six Buddha Districts.
By the 1810s, its population had already risen to 3,000 household inhabitants (GZD Bo Lin 1813).
The Development of the Five Buddha Districts Based on Nanzha-Mannuo
The central temple at Nanzha was not only a political center but also a base for training young monks. Monk Tong Jin and his successors claimed that they were the reincarnation of creation god E Sha himself. According to myth in the Upper and Lower Converts region, E Sha was the creator of the world and a human being. But in Chinese documents, Monk Tong Jin and his sons and grandsons were known as the Luohei Taiye ( ), a king-like chief. This master and great savior could be reincarnated generation by generation, sometimes disappearing, but then returning to save people from suffering. It is believed that all knowledge and skills known to people must come from E Sha. Based on this idea, Zhang Fuguo and his followers also set up the Nanzha temple as a school for religious education and leadership training (YST 1959a) .
The development process of this Five Buddha Districts system, after the first temple was built in Nanzha, was gradual. Nanzha and Mannuo were close to the ferry point crossings of the Mekong River, enabling the monks to easily control the transportation routes from Mengban to Mengmeng and Mengyun (Shang Yun ), which linked the Wa mountains to Burma and the inner counties of China (Ma 2013c). These used to be the most important routes for goods being transported between various regional business centers, such as silver from the mines at Maolong and Munai, cotton imported from nearby valleys and from Burma, tea from the Dashan Tea plantations ( ), and salt that was produced at the Weiyuan salt wells and sold to the (YST 1959b; Atwill 2005) . Later, the Qing army arrested Zhang Dengfa and one of his sons, Zhang Shibao. However, neither man could speak the Han Chinese language, which was used during their trials; they could speak only the Lahu language, according to the official archives (Qiu 1948) . This Zhang family's relationship also showed that the Five Buddha Districts system was not was isolated from state governance and local politics. Because of the religious movement, increasing numbers of Han immigrants became Lahu.
The Five Buddha Districts as a Political Entity Attached to the State
Some groups, like the Lisuo, Laomian, and Han, joined with the Lahu to become the Lahu of today. Some of their surnames, such as Bai, Tie, Shi, Ji, and Kong, could also be found among Lahu people. Even if surnames are not very significant in Lahu, since they can be taken from the father's or mother's side (Du 2002) , they are still important historical reminders that show the complex origins of the Lahu people. According to local documents, the original Han immigrants who had converted to Lahu were known as the "Small Yellow Luohei" ( ) (Zhou [1945] 2007, 730). to the west of the Mekong River had become well organized into a three-layered political system with a religious and political center. This system existed for more than a hundred years, from the 1790s to the early 1900s, despite the center being destroyed in 1888 by the Qing army. Even today, many Lahu people in Yunnan, Burma, and Thailand still practice this localized religious tradition, which originally came from Jizu Mountain. However, there is no significant reason to suggest that this system has any relationship with "shifting agriculture as 'escape agriculture'" (Scott 2009, 191) . Some Lahu practiced slash-and-burn agriculture in certain areas over various time periods, but most of them also practiced wet-rice farming on the mountainsides. Other Lahu were businessmen. They had all escaped from somewhere, but they had established a centralized political hierarchy since the 1790s.
Thus, the development of the Five Buddha Districts system was based mainly on the Quan model, through which the Mengmeng, Menglian, and nearby chieftains could control the mountain communities. In this grassroots political system, village heads were responsible for collecting taxes for the chieftains. But the monks promoted a different political model, based on their political ideals, through this Five Buddha system. In this way, not only was the centralized leadership of villages and districts, but also the cultural mechanism of a "Buddha-kind system," was established. This system gradually came to be accepted among the Luohei and some of the Wa communities. In the wars against the Qing and the Dai chieftains, the militarization in these communities achieved its peak when warriors were organized to fight against the official army based in fortresses along the Mekong River, but their families were organized into different camps in the forest along the mountainside. The militarization also stimulated the later cultural integration of the Lahu (Ma 2011, 2012; GZD Shu Lin 1801). As a social and cultural consequence, the Lahu reorganized based partly on village terraced rice field agriculture and communal hierarchy, but more on the bilateral, nonlineal kinship system. This system constituted Facing the coming of British imperialism, Xue Fucheng, the Chinese minister to Britain, contributed his thoughts about the border issue to the Qing court:
International affairs should be considered as a positive negotiation. It is not correct if we think that some small pieces of land are not significant enough to enlarge or reduce the area of China. During the Qianglong reign (1711-1799), the Burmese occupied some chieftain territories relying on its stronger power, whereas the areas outside the Eight Gates [Ba Guan , claimed in the Ming dynasty] have been largely lost already. The border on the southwestern frontier is ambiguous. If we do not try to extend the border forward, the lands will be occupied by [the British]. (Xue 1971, 4) According to Xue's strategy, if the Qing government had to draw a clear border with Burma, the first step was to extend the Qing government's territory. The Five Buddha Districts system had to be destroyed first to allow a county to be built in this area. These steps were necessary preparation for the later border negotiations with British powers in Burma. In summary, the Five Buddha Districts system was established by immigrant elites among the mountain peoples, but it was still a kind of appendage to the Qing state. The Qing state appointed and recognized Monk Tong Jin as a native official, but the Han gentry and Dai chieftains sometimes regarded him as a rebel bandit leader. Although it needed money to face the coming Western colonial power, the Qing government considered this recognition and its timing as a necessary strategy in order to control these territories. The Qing state therefore sent troops to destroy the Five Buddha system and build a new county, causing social suffering for the Lahu people through war and destruction. In this way, both the Zhang family and the Han heterodox monks worked as important state agents in shaping a polity outside but also attached to the state.
The mobilization of Lahu identity and a political framework in the Luohei Mountains occurred outside the reach of official judicial power but was a political space adhered to the Qing empire.
These monks used human agency to create a miniature state judicial system outside of the state, but they also worked to adhere the region to imperial state power. In other words, the Lahu and peoples like them have never been "freedom" or "anarchist" peoples who were separated from the state or who could keep the state at a distance, as suggested by James Scott (2009) , even if the styles of the states were different. Why can we not just define the Five Buddha Districts system as a state-like polity attached to the state?
Conclusion
Some classical studies on political systems in the frontier mountains between China and Burma show that the Kachin's social model, which is based on the oscillation between egalitarian (gumlao) and hierarchical (gumsa) political forms, is a result of differing forms of compromise between two conflicting ethnic systems (Leach 1986, 292; Friedman 1998, 44) . But the Five Buddha Districts system provides another perspective from which to review the relationship between the state and frontier society. First, it suggests that we cannot simply consider the Southeast Asian highlands as a very diverse region and review the details of how the It is hard to say whether the Lahu liked to keep the state at a distance through their "escaping culture," or by slash-and-burn agriculture, even when they were in Yunnan, or in Burma under different state powers after the 1880s. If the term "Zomia people," used by James Scott, suggests mountain people who could use their culture to keep the state at a distance, and if it is based on the condition that they had already acquired stable identities or cultural subjectivity before making their choice to escape in their everyday lives, the history of the Lahu and the formation of southern Yunnan do not match these criteria. As we learned above, the Lahu identity resulted from certain social consequences of frontier construction under different state powers. It was a mutual process between political groups and, regardless of whether they have many cultural differences or similarities or not, it is still possible to trace back the history of "where they come from," and also to review the possibility of the correspondence between identities and political practices in the last several centuries. Monk Tong Jin and his Zhang family had been early frontier agents for the Qing state and acted as human agents in the reconstruction of everyday life among the mountain people, even though they were regarded as the reincarnated E Sha Buddha by the Lahu villagers. On the other hand, they were also regarded as native chieftains for the Qing officials, or they were appointed officials of the rebellious Panthay power, or were regard by the Mianning Han gentries as Lahu kings. This doesn't mean that there was no relationship between their political practice and Lahu historical memory, and it is clear that the Five Buddha Districts system, as a three-layered centralized or state-like polity, existed in history. Society" and GRF642112 (2012-2013) "Identity Formation and Social Interdependency based on the Bazi System."
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Notes
1
"Lahu" ( ) was written as "Luohei" ( ) in Chinese before 1953. In the native Yunnan Han dialect, "Lahu" has been pronounced as "Lao He," which is equal to "Luo Hei" ( In the areas controlled by Dai chieftains in southern Yunnan, such as in Sipsongpanna, Menglian, Gengma, and Shuangjiang, there were two different taxation units for basins and mountains. The quan ( ) was a taxation unit in mountains. The head of a quan was responsible for collecting taxes from several mountain villages of this unit for the local Dai chieftain, based on a fixed ratio. However, unlike in a basin, the chieftains could not control these mountain communities directly. A taxation unit in the basins was known as a meng (勐). 4
The Muga Valley has also been the author's anthropological fieldwork site since 1995. 5
From the author's field notes on the Lahu in Fazhanhe xian, April 10, 2010.
